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1. INTRODUCTION
The Fukushima disaster, for accident is too mild a
term, has already been the subject of many discussions
and analyses, and will continue to be so for the foreseeable
future. Some of these will try to establish the root causes,
both out of a belief that such root causes can be found,
and also to satisfy the feeling of justice – or responsibility
– among the public, among experts, and among politicians
(and probably among other groups as well). Others will
debate the issues of the social responsibility of nuclear
power, something that is already seen in, e.g., Germany
and Italy. Yet others will re-analyse and reinterpret the
events in order to find salient explanations that somehow
transcend the simple notion of root causes, and point to
system-wide and momentous factors that hitherto have
been neglected. Here the continued scrutiny and repeated
post mortems, of Tenerife, Three Mile Island, Challenger,
Chernobyl, Columbia, Deepwater Horizon, etc., are good
examples.
In this paper we will try something a little different,
namely to look at the Fukushima disaster from the per-
spective of Resilience Engineering. Resilience Engineering
represents a new way of thinking about safety, that, since
the first Symposium in 2004, has become widely recognised
as a valuable complement to the established safety view
[1]. Both industry and academia have recognised that
Resilience Engineering offers novel ways to confront the
puzzles of complexity, interconnectedness, system of
systems, and ultra high reliability. The concepts and
principles of Resilience Engineering have been tested and
refined by applications in such fields as air traffic manage-
ment, offshore production, health care, and commercial
fishing. Continued work has also made it clear that resil-
ience is neither limited to handling threats and disturbances,
nor confined to situations where something can go wrong.
Today, resilience is understood as the intrinsic ability of
a system to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or follow-
ing changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required
operations under both expected and unexpected conditions
[2]. This definition emphasises two characteristics of a
resilient system. First, that when something happens, a
resilient system does not simply try to react and recover;
it also looks for how it can continue to achieve its purpose
by adjusting and changing its functioning. Second, that it is
prepared to deal not only with disturbances and disruptions,
but with diverse conditions of functioning, expected as
well as unexpected. Resilience engineering is not just
important as a way to improve safety, but can also help
to ensure the economic survival of an organisation when
challenged by internal and external changes [3]. 
In order to be resilient, a system must be able to do four
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things: (1) To respond quickly and effectively to expected
and unexpected conditions (disturbances as well as oppor-
tunities) either by implementing a prepared set of responses,
or by adjusting everyday functioning, and also be able to
sustain the response until control of the situation has been
regained. (2) To monitor that which is, or can become, a
change or disturbance in the near term, covering both what
happens in the environment and what happens in the system
itself, i.e., its own performance. (3) To learn from experi-
ence, in particular knowing how to learn the right lessons
from the right experience – successes as well as failures.
And finally, (4) to anticipate developments, threats, and
opportunities further into the future, such as potential
changes, novel needs, increased demands, and tighter
constraints. 
“The system” is, of course, a loose concept. It may
refer to designers, users, regulators, stakeholders, and the
public. It may also refer to the Fukushima nuclear power
plant, to the owner and operator, the Tokyo Electrical
Power Company (TEPCO), to the regulator (the Nuclear
and Industry Safety Agency), etc. Since this paper clearly
cannot look at all possible systems, we have chosen to focus
on two, namely the world of engineering experts (safety
experts) and the operating company (TEPCO). One repre-
sents the design and pre-analyses of the power plant, while
the other represents the operations and management of
both the expected and the unexpected.
2. THE EVENT ITSELF
On March 11th 2011, a tsunami caused by a gigantic
earthquake hit the Tohoku Region pacific coast in Northern
Japan. The seismic centre was estimated to be about 130
kilometres east of the Oshika Peninsula of Tohoku, and
24 km underneath the seabed. It extended 500 km along
the coastline with a width of 200 km. The intensity of the
earthquake was 9.0 on the Richter scale, making it the
fourth-largest earthquake recorded since 1900. 
The earthquake created a gigantic tsunami wave that
was about 10 m high at maximum. Once it reached land,
it ran up to 40 m above the sea level and intruded 6 km
inland, causing catastrophic damage to many people and
towns along the coastline. About twenty thousand people
lost their lives or are still missing, the major cause of their
death being by drowning. 
The earthquake totally disrupted the infrastructure of
the region; electricity, gas, water, and railway. And while
it is commonly known that several nuclear power plants
were lost, the reduction in electrical generating capacity due
to the loss of fossil power plants was actually larger. All
major roads in the region were damaged, making it difficult
for the rescuers to reach the affected areas.
Immediately after the earthquake occurred, all the
operating nuclear reactors at the Fukushima #1 plant, three
out of the six, were successfully shut down. But soon after
that the external power was lost because:
• The electrical line shorted out.
• The electrical switchgear and transformer went out
of order.
• A power transmission tower was toppled by the
earthquake, rather than by the Tsunami.
Following the loss of the external electricity supply, the
emergency backup diesel generators started successfully.
But approximately fifty minutes after the earthquake, the
Tsunami hit the plant with the wave running up to 14 to
15 m at the perimeter of the plant. Since the emergency
backup generators were located under the ground, they
were flooded with seawater. Electrical equipment, pumps,
and fuel tanks were washed away or damaged. As a result,
the plant suffered a total loss of electrical power (i.e. Station
Blackout) in what can aptly be described as a complete
common mode failure.
3. THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES
The immediate consequence of the loss of electrical
power was core melt at Reactors #1, #2, and #3, which in
turn caused the massive release of radioactive materials into
the environment. Within a few days, the reactor buildings
of Reactors #1, #3, and #4 blew up, because the hydrogen
that was produced inside the reactor pressure vessels leaked
into the buildings and exploded. Fallen building walls and
ceilings further damaged the major equipment and piping
systems. This made it difficult to cool the core and the
spent fuel pits via regular cooling lines, and also severely
hampered visual inspection.
At the time of the explosions, a large quantity of radio-
active materials was released. An increased radiation level
was measured in wide areas, including Tokyo, and the
contamination by caesium was recorded even further away,
in the Kanto Region west of Tokyo. The quantity of radio-
active materials released to the environment was enormous,
allegedly several hundreds Peta-Becquerel. The rise in
radiation level and the concentration of radioactive mate-
rials in the environment, mostly caesium, were however,
not significant outside a 20-km evacuation area, except
for the so-called hot spots. In these, the radiation level was
relatively higher because of fallout caused by rainfall and
special geological conditions. For some of the hot spots,
the government ordered people to evacuate even if the
locations were outside the 20-km forced evacuation area.
In addition, the government asked people in some areas
to be ready for evacuation, if it became necessary due to
long-term exposure.
4. A RESILIENCE ENGINEERING VIEW OF THE
FUKUSHIMA DISASTER
Before we try to apply a resilience engineering per-
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spective to what the safety experts and the TEPCO did, it
is necessary to look at the four resilience abilities a little
more closely. As mentioned above, the four are the ability
to respond, to monitor, to learn, and to anticipate. 
• Responding means knowing what to do, or being
able to respond to regular and irregular variability,
disturbances, and opportunities, either by adjusting
the way things are done, or by activating ready-
made responses. 
• Monitoring means knowing what to look for, or being
able to monitor that which in the near term changes,
or could change, so much that it would require a re-
sponse. The monitoring must cover the system’s own
performance, as well as changes in the environment. 
• Learning means knowing what has happened, or
being able to learn from experience, in particular to
learn the right lessons from the right experience. 
• Anticipating means knowing what to expect, or being
able to anticipate developments, threats, and oppor-
tunities further into the future, such as potential dis-
ruptions or changing operating conditions. 
The four abilities offer a convenient way to characterise
resilient performance, but they are of course not indepen-
dent. In order to understand how a system or an organisation
can be resilient, it is therefore necessary to describe the
ways in which they are functionally coupled, or depend on
each other. A detailed description of the functional couplings
is beyond the scope of this paper, but the following should
be sufficient to explain what this might mean in the case
of the Fukushima disaster. The major dependencies are
also shown in Figure 1, using the principles of the FRAM
(Functional Resonance Analysis Method) [4]. The purpose
of the FRAM is to identify and model the functions that
are required to provide a specific capability, or to carry
out a specific activity. Each function is described in terms
of six aspects, namely Input (I), Output (O), Precondition
(P), Resource (R), Control (C), and Time (T). Whenever
any of the <I, P, R, C, T> aspects are specified for a function,
they must also be represented as an <O> aspect of one or
more other functions. Similarly, the <O> aspect of a function
must occur as an <I, P, R, C, T> aspect of another function.
These simple rules guarantee that the resulting model is
complete. 
• Responding can be triggered by external and/or internal
events. Responding requires that the system is in a
state of readiness, and that the necessary resources
(e.g., tools, materials, and people) are available. The
actual response is controlled by plans and procedures,
predefined or ad hoc, and may require a rescheduling
or cessation of ongoing actions. The set of predefined
responses represents both what has happened in the
past (learning), and what may happen in the future
(anticipation). Responding can obviously be primed
and facilitated by monitoring. 
Fig. 1. Main Dependencies Among the four Capabilities of Resilience
• The input to monitoring comes from external and
internal developments, while anticipation and learning
provide the background for selecting indicators, and
prioritising and interpreting data. Effective monitoring
requires that time and resources are available, that
there is a monitoring strategy, and that the people
involved have the requisite skills and knowledge.
• Learning should use past events and responses, either
own experiences or those of others, even if these
have not resulted in something requiring a response.
Learning is ‘controlled’ by the organisation’s accident
model, that in practice determines which data and
events are considered [5]. 
• Anticipation depends on what has been learned from
the past (lessons learned), and is guided by the organi-
sation’s ‘model of the future,’ in particular the types
of threats or opportunities that this model can describe.
The main resource is competent people, while a pre-
condition is the organisational culture or mindfulness
[6], or a ‘constant sense of unease’ [7].
To illustrate how the rendering in Figure 1 should be
‘read,’ consider the relation between the ability to learn,
shown as the hexagon labelled ‘Learning,’ and the three
other abilities. As the figure shows, the Output from
Learning is one of the Inputs to Anticipation (and the
only one shown here). It is also used by Monitoring, both
as a Control of what is monitored, and to define the time
characteristics of monitoring. The Output is finally used
as a resource for Responding. Similarly, the Output from
Responding is a primary Input to Learning.
Using these considerations, it seems reasonable to take
a closer look at the dependency between the ability to
anticipate and the ability to respond. It should first of all
be noted that it clearly is impossible to prepare a response
to something that has not been considered in advance. (It
may be possible to give a response, of course, but a spon-
taneous response will in most cases be less efficient than
one that has been prepared.) And the basis for considering
something in advance is either experience (learning) or
anticipation, where the latter depends on the former as
described above.
In the case of Fukushima, we shall focus on the engi-
neers’ ability to anticipate, and how that, in combination
with the TEPCO’s ability to respond (or lack thereof), laid
the grounds for the calamitous situation in March 2011.
5. ANTICIPATING FUKUSHIMA
In the case of Fukushima, two uses of anticipation are
important. The first is the anticipation that is – or should
be – part of the building and siting of the Fukushima nuclear
power plant itself (design related anticipation). The second
is the anticipation that deals with the safe operation of the
plant, once it has been built and commissioned (operation
related anticipation). 
5.1 Design Related Anticipation
The design related anticipation refers to the ability to
consider what may possibly happen, especially whether
there is anything that may seriously jeopardise the plant’s
structural and functional integrity. Westrum [8] has argued
that three types of threats should be considered. Regular
threats are events that occur so often that the system learns
how to respond, and so often that it is cost-effective to
establish a standard response. Irregular threats are one-off
events. While such events may be recognised, there are
so many different varieties, that it is neither practically
possible, nor cost-effective to provide a standard response.
Finally, unexampled events represent those occurrences
that are virtually impossible to imagine, and which exceed
the organisation’s collective experience. What happened
at Fukushima on March 11, 2011 clearly falls into that
category. Design related anticipation should look at least
to the irregular threats, but should also acknowledge the
possibility of unexampled events.
During the initial design review of Fukushima, a scien-
tific study was obviously made to assess the likelihood of
major earthquakes. In 2004, an earthquake that was larger
than the design basis hit the Kashiwazaki Nuclear Power
Plant located on the opposite side of the main land, i.e.,
at the Sea of Japan. In this case some geological faults
had apparently been overlooked in the investigation that
was part of the initial site appraisal. This demonstrates
that the initial appraisal cannot be complete, and that new
information can become available. The case of the Fuku-
shima disaster is another example of this.
The scale of the March 2011 Tohoku earthquake was
much larger than the design basis, and the height of the
Tsunami was twice what had been assumed. The tsunami
wall was designed to withstand a 5.7 meter wave, which
was far too little in the actual case. Does this mean that the
design assumptions were wrong? In hindsight we can, of
course, say that they were inadequate, but to learn any-
thing from this disaster we need to find out why that was so. 
The probability of a large earthquake hitting the affected
areas was known to be very high, well before the earthquake
actually hit the region. But the initial investigation apparently
did not assume that more than few faults would be activated
simultaneously. With the Tsunami, the assumptions were
also based on a historical review, but tsunamis are few and
far between. The tsunami wall was designed with a height
of 5.7 meters, although the reason for that is not clear. In
2002 the Tsunami Evaluation Subcommittee of the Nuclear
Civil Engineering Committee of the Japanese Society of
Civil Engineers published a report on “Tsunami Assessment
Method for Nuclear Power Plants in Japan”. In 2008,
TEPCO used this method to confirm the safety of the nuclear
plants at Daiichi. But there is, of course, no way this could
have influenced the design decision when the plant was
built in the 1960s. After the Tsunami had happened, it
became clear that a historical study had revealed that a
much larger Tsunami occurred in the middle of the ninth
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century (estimated to be in AD 869), and that a researcher
had made a strong recommendation for refurbishment of
the plant in 2006. But, the recommendation was reportedly
turned down for the reason that the tsunami was hypotheti-
cal, and because the claimed evidence was not accepted
by specialists in the nuclear sector.
The case for a nuclear power plant design usually looks
perfect – as indeed, it has to. But people tend to forget that
the actual design may include assumptions that are only
justified by a strong belief that the overall framework is
perfect. This belief may override the scientific value of
PRA (Probabilistic Risk Analysis). PRA is widely used in
the nuclear industry to assess the possibility of rare events
that are beyond the design basis. But a PRA involves sub-
jective judgements that may be subject to the influence of
faulty belief.
One of the authors found meeting minutes in which
an expert representing an electrical company said that it
might be generally worthwhile to show that nuclear power
plants would be able to withstand a Tsunami. The conno-
tation for this person was that the result of assessment
was already given, before the assessment was actually
conducted during the design process. In other words, the
assessment was conducted to support a belief that the
plant would be safe. It cannot be ruled out that such an
atmosphere prevails in the nuclear industry – in Japan
and elsewhere.
As this brief discussion demonstrates, design related
anticipation was constrained by other concerns. Quite apart
from the ‘imperious immediacy of interest’ [9], even a
preliminary risk assessment will be constrained by time
and resources. It is not very difficult to find a very large
number of potential risks or threats, but there may be insuf-
ficient time and resources – or even motivation – to do
so, and to evaluate them thoroughly. The anticipation is
therefore constrained, often by referring to shared assump-
tions about what is likely and what is not. But thoroughness
is a prerequisite for efficiency, not least in the perspective
of a system’s life cycle [10].
5.2 Operation Related Anticipation
Risk assessment is the formalised way of anticipation
that has become the de facto standard across most industries.
Institutionally, it could be claimed that the design of the
Fukushima reactors met the regulatory requirements. The
fact that the accidents happened could therefore mean
either that the regulations were faulty, or that the design
was not good enough. But more important than that was
the complacency that came from a strong belief among
experts that the plant design was perfect. It was therefore,
in practice, unthinkable for them to imagine a situation
where the plant would totally lose electricity, and conse-
quently totally lose its cooling capability. In Westrum’s
terminology (op. cit.), this was not just an irregular threat,
it was an unexampled event. We thus see that the neglect
of scientific advice was most grave; scientists did point
out that a much larger Tsunami might hit the nuclear power
plant, and that the plant needed to be modified for it to be
able to survive. But this was one of the conditions that were
discarded, because they were seen as being too improbable.
Another problem for anticipation is the way that domain
experts perceive the role and function of PRA. We all
know that PRA has both advantages and disadvantages.
The formal framework of PRA looks well balanced, and
provides a systematic way of evaluating the potential risks
associated with situations beyond the design basis. However,
a PRA as such is static, and therefore unable properly to
represent the dynamics of severe conditions. Another
problem is that the availability of data is questionable and
that the quality does not correspond to the ‘beauty’ of the
formal framework. In particular, since 1990, domain experts
have argued over the availability and the reliability of data
on erroneous human behaviours [11]. Even the staunchest
believers in Human Reliability Assessment (HRA), today
accept that the modelling of erroneous human behaviours
leaves much room for improvement. Yet despite these
misgivings, PRA is still used as if it was perfectly reliable. 
6. RESPONDING TO THE DISASTER
The ability to respond refers both to the day-to-day
operations, and to exceptional circumstances. In this case
we shall consider only the latter. 
As explained above, domain experts seem to believe
that PRA gives a sufficient foundation for risk management,
hence for the ability to respond. We beg to disagree. What
is required in really severe situations is far beyond what the
plant design can provide. Consider the following example.
In case of the Fukushima disaster, the electricity was totally
lost. Plant personnel therefore had to find other ways of
securing electricity, even if the methods were unusual.
Electricity trucks (i.e., large vehicles equipped with gener-
ators, and used as a movable electrical source) were thought
of as one of the last resorts. Many electricity trucks did in
fact try to reach the plant, but failed to do so in time. TEPCO
tried to use two trucks available at the plant, but it took
too long before they could start supplying the electricity,
and soon after they did the electricity-hydrogen explosion
happened, which damaged the cable. At that point the
electricity was irrevocably lost. During the course of these
efforts, the governmental emergency management team
tried to help TEPCO by transporting an electricity truck
by helicopter, but found that the truck was too heavy for
airborne transportation. In the end, the core was severely
damaged because electrical power could not be provided
in time. 
It is not unreasonable to assume that the availability of
electricity trucks was not thoroughly investigated in the
PRA. If the PRA analysts seriously studied the total loss
of electricity and countermeasures against it, they should
have realized that the available electricity trucks were too
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heavy, and that remedial measures therefore had to be
considered. In practice, however, the purpose of PRA is
to assess the failure probabilities and improve on important
risk factors that are found in the plant design. The purpose
is not to find all the possible failures, or to consider remedial
measures for severe conditions that go beyond the use of
regular plant equipment. (Nevertheless, there are some
cases in which supplemental systems are added to the
original plant system, in consequence of a PRA, so that
severe situations with relatively lower probabilities, e.g.,
10E-9, can be mitigated.)
The flexibility of organisational or human characteristics
can make the system well tuned to regularly recurring
situations by trading-off thoroughness for efficiency. But
at the same time, this trade-off will deprive the system of
the resilient properties that are needed to face real world
problems. One lesson learnt from the accident of the Fuku-
shima nuclear power plant is that we need to think not only
about how the plant should work and respond to regular
threats, but also how it possibly could have or acquire the
properties that would make it resilient. In the case of Fuku-
shima, it appears that the assumed technical perfection was
a hindrance to even thinking of acquiring these properties.
In other words, overconfidence in the experts’ anticipation
of what might go wrong limited the ability to monitor and
respond – and, to some extent, also to learn – hence im-
peded the development of resilience.
7. DISCUSSION
It is hardly a surprise that people in the nuclear industry
generally believe in the accuracy of technical analyses
and expert judgements, at least until an accident actually
happens. For this reason an accident is, for most of them,
really a bolt out of the blue – an unexpected and unexam-
pled event. It is all too easy to find statements from experts
who once were full of confidence in the theoretical bases
of the design, as well as the rationality of their practical
assumptions, but who later regretted their short-sightedness.
It has repeatedly been reported by the Japanese media
that the commissioner of the Nuclear Safety Commission
(NSC) of Japan apologetically admitted that their judgement
to exclude the consideration of a Station Blackout (SBO)
was a mistake. It is known that a working group of NSC
in 1993 pointed out that an SBO was possible, but that
the NSC and the government did not listen to the advice.
The same phenomenon of over-confidence applies to
the importance given to PRA. In the nuclear industry, PRA
is used as a tool that provides a systematic way of rank-
ordering important risk-dominant events that are beyond
the design basis. For events that turn out to be critical as
expressed by, e.g., the commonly used risk matrix, design
changes or remedial improvement are made. Low prob-
ability – and low consequence – events are simply left out.
PRA is thus a plant design tool that leads to an economically
justifiable basis. The result is a plant where risks are “As
Low As Reasonable Practicable”, except that ‘practicable’
usually means ‘affordable.’ 
The height of the Tsunami should have been rigorously
assessed, and the calculations formally approved in the
initial design. But people forgot to be mindful, and to
sustain a “constant sense of unease.” In other words, they
forgot that previously justified assumptions should be
questioned every now and then.
It is, however, not acceptable to neglect severe events
just because they have a low probability. It is important also
to study the probability of survival from severe conditions
– e.g., the success paths [12]. Instead of focusing on what
can go wrong or how something can fail, we must focus
on what should go right or how something should work.
Since this cannot be done by PRA, due to its focus on
hazards, risks, and failures, we need to find a perspective
that looks at system performance as a whole, especially
how it dynamically develops and changes over time. This
is what resilience engineering tries to achieve. Instead of
looking at how the lack of one or more of the four abilities
can lead to failure, resilience engineering emphasises how
the strengthening of these abilities can lead to success, or
at least to survival. Because established risk assessment
methods set a limit based on what is believed to be logical
thinking, and do not care about regions beyond that, antici-
pation becomes very constrained. This has consequences
for the abilities to monitor and respond, as we have seen
in the Fukushima example. 
A system cannot be resilient, i.e., be able to cope with
unexpected severe situations, if it is limited to designed
features alone. Over-confidence limits the engineers’
imagination, and impedes the justification of additional
remedial measures on both economical and philosophical
grounds. Such over-confidence is widespread among
experts in the nuclear industry, and in other industries as
well – offshore production being the most spectacular
example. The problem is thus unfortunately not new. But
because it is old it has become dormant, and is therefore
not easily visible.
The trivial lesson from the study of rare events is that
they are very difficult to anticipate. Almost as trivial is
the lesson that these events are due to a non-trivial
combination of multiple factors, many of which are
considered irrelevant to safety. In the traditional safety
perspective these factors are described, e.g., as active
failures – particularly ‘human errors’ – and latent
conditions. Resilience engineering sees them differently,
namely as the variability of everyday functioning – either
on the general level of the four abilities, or on the
concrete level of everyday performance. This variability
is not confined to the operational state, but exists
throughout the life cycle of the installation – from design
to decommissioning. What we can learn by looking at an
accident from the resilience engineering perspective is,
thus, how differences in emphasis of (or priority assigned
to) the four abilities can be used to understand how
potential – and actual – weaknesses in the system arise,
and where they can be found. The purpose is not to
determine what failed, or look for who is responsible.
The point is rather to try to understand, as best we may,
how complicated such systems are, not only in their
momentary functioning – whether it be during everyday
or exceptional conditions – but through the extended
existence or life cycle. Resilience can be seen in the way
the organisation responded when the event happened.
But resilience can also be seen in the way the organisation
functioned in the preceding years. It is only in this
context that we can begin to glimpse – but perhaps not
yet fully see – how choices made at one stage influence
what happens and what can be done later on. What is
gained from such an exercise is not just an appreciation
of how complicated things are, but rather an understanding
of how functions are coupled, and how these couplings
may affect the ability to respond to extreme conditions.
Once this has been understood, even tentatively, it is
possible to work constructively on how to improve
matters.
8. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper has been to demonstrate
how a resilience engineering perspective can supplement
the traditional approaches to understanding industrial safety
– both when it works and when it fails. The case in point
has been the disaster at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear
power plant in Japan, and resilience engineering principles
have been used to describe how shortcomings in the ability
to anticipate, both during design and during the response
to the natural disaster, laid the grounds for the unfortunate
outcomes. 
The main conclusion is that formal risk assessments
trust established methods and models more than they
should. Established methods and models have become
accepted in practice, because they seem to offer an accept-
able trade-off between thoroughness and efficiency. In
other words, they seem to offer the necessary thoroughness
of analysis, meaning that they identify all the risks that
are ‘necessary,’ but without being unnecessarily costly in
time or resources. This happens in every field of activity,
and examples can easily be found in finance, in engineering,
in medicine, and in offshore exploration. Because severe
accidents are very rare, we easily become overconfident
in the analysis methods. The reasoning seems to go
something like this: We have analysed the possible risks;
we have built the installation following the recommen-
dations; and we have operated safely for n years – whatever
n is. This reasoning is, however, fallacious, because the
absence of a failure does not prove that the precautions
were correct, or even sufficient. Resilience engineering
advocates a constant sense of unease, that we should be
mindful of what we do, to counteract the overconfidence
that is a side effect of the relative safety of nuclear instal-
lations. 
Resilience engineering provides a way to identify the
capabilities that a complex socio-technical system must
have to perform acceptably in everyday situations, as
well as during accidents. In that sense, it is a complement
to other engineering methods, rather than a replacement.
Resilience engineering provides a contrast to classical
risk assessment methods such as PRA, by showing how
things can go right, and what is needed for this to happen,
rather than just showing how things can go wrong. Safety
is not the freedom from unacceptable risks, but the ability
to succeed during expected and unexpected conditions
alike. In order to bring this about, it is necessary to describe
the system as a whole, and to understand how the various
functions are coupled and depend on each other. Large-
scale socio-technical systems, such as nuclear power plants,
have become so complex that they seriously challenge
established safety methods. While resilience engineering
may not provide ready-made answers to the new problems,
it does help us to see them more clearly, and also provides
the basic principles from which such solutions can be
developed.
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